"Pay What You Want: How Radiohead Took the Online Gamble That Could Change the Record Business"
by Jon Pareles @ NY Times, Arts&Leisure section
December 8, 2007
Radiohead's distribution of its latest album, "In Rainbows", is proving to be a success, but the band won't tell us just how many copies of the album have been downloaded, what % of those who downloaded it did so for free, or what the average price is for those who voluntarily paid to download the album. At first I did not like that the band would not tell the public these statistics. I was confident that it would make money and I felt it was necessary to make this information public in order to prove to the public that the the current copyright laws do not actually benefit the musicians, but rather the major record labels and the media industry at large. After reading today's article in the NY times, "Pay What You Want: How Radiohead Took the Online Gamble That Could Change the Record Business", I changed my mind. Not only does it seem like the band has caused quite a stir within the music business and among the general public, but it is evident that the old school industry is scared that others will follow in Radiohead's path even without knowing the financial outcome of the band's strategical move. In a way, this is the ultimate success for those who feel that the current copyright system does not promote the interests of creators, artists and the like.
Also it is worth noting, according to this article, that Public Enemy and the Smashing Pumpkins gave away albums over the internet several years ago. Perhaps the fact that Radiohead is more of a cult-like, less mainstream band, has gained them greater recognition, or because they are not only giving away "In Rainbows", but rather, offering people the opportunty to pay for it if want to do so. Who knows?
The only data regarding downloads and sales that was made available in this article comes from ComScore which claims, according to their market research, that the average price per download was $2.26, including the zero cost of free downloands. ComScore did not specify the total number of downloads, but it said that 'a significant %' of the 1.2 million people who have visited the inrainbows.com website in October of 2007 did download the album.
The album is incredible and I highly recommend giving it a listen...to download it go to: www.inrainbows.com
I paid 5 Euros for the album.
Showing posts with label music. Show all posts
Showing posts with label music. Show all posts
Saturday, December 8, 2007
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
DRM, Interoperatiblity and eInnovation
DRM, or digital rights management, refers to software and hardware based restrictions placed on creative material which aims at protecting a copyright holder’s interest in limiting access to the material. DRM determines where and how you can access a digital product and what modifications, if any, you can make to the content. DRM can be viewed as conflicting with systems interoperability---that is, the ability or lack of ability for a user to play a song downloaded on Itunes on her Zune. Also, because DRM restrictions can exceed uses of copyrighted material that would normally be protected by Section 107 fair use protection, innovation is also inhibited. Urs Gasser and John Palfrey, from the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard have produced an exhaustive study, published in November 2007, which analyses these issues in terms of law and technology. Their report is entitled “DRM-protected Music Interoperability and eInnovation.” They conclude “that the best way to determine the optimal level of interoperability and means of accomplishing it is to rely upon economic-based assessments on a case-by-case basis.”
Monday, November 26, 2007
The problem with how the U.S. legal system responded to digital technology
"Promoting Diverse Cultural Expression: Lessons from the U.S. Copyright Wars"
Raymond Shih Ray Ku
This article provides a concise and non-technical explanation of the problem (or misunderstanding) the general public (including creators themselves!) has with regard to the current debate over the copyright legal system's response to new digital technologies and the internet. For most of copyright's history, the interests of creators and distributors were considered to be the same and were generally aligned with those of the public or audience. Ku asks, 'whose interests does copyright law protect in today's day and age?' As a result of new technologies, it is critical that the copyright system no longer couple the interests of creators and distributors because their interest are frequently different. Ku supports the notion that today's copyright system is structured to protect the interests of yesterday's distributors.
"[I]f adequate financial incentives or market conditions exist to inspire the creative acitivity of authors and encourage them to make their works available to the public without copyright, copyright protection should not be recognized." [pg 6-FN 40]
"Today, the economics of digital technology renders copyright both unnecessary and inefficient. In general, discussions about the optimal level of copyright protection ignore distinctions between the incentives from creation and distribution. In part, the bundling of these interests was strategic. Distributors found that it was to their political advantage to have their interests treated as inseperable from the interest of creators. In addition to the rhetorical power of equating the interests of distributors with creators, until now the bundling of interests was acceptable because the cost of producing the vessels --CD's, books, DVD's-- for content, and distributing those vessels, was an essential component of making content available to the public. As a result, both sets of costs had to be considered if the public was to enjoy and have access to the products of human creativity. However, as the following demonstrates, because the Internet and digital technology have revolutionized the ways in which we disseminate information, it is no longer appropriate to treat these interests as interchangeable. Once they are unbundled, it becomes clear that copyright protection cannot be justified as a means of ensuring distribution and is an impermissibly inefficient means for ensuring creation." [pg 6]
Ku makes his argument by using the music industry as an example of how the interest of creators and distributors are deceptively coupled, but in reality, they are no longer aligned. He makes his case by comparing the change in income for artists from CD sales vs. live performances since the introduction of the internet and the advancement in digital technologies.
Raymond Shih Ray Ku
This article provides a concise and non-technical explanation of the problem (or misunderstanding) the general public (including creators themselves!) has with regard to the current debate over the copyright legal system's response to new digital technologies and the internet. For most of copyright's history, the interests of creators and distributors were considered to be the same and were generally aligned with those of the public or audience. Ku asks, 'whose interests does copyright law protect in today's day and age?' As a result of new technologies, it is critical that the copyright system no longer couple the interests of creators and distributors because their interest are frequently different. Ku supports the notion that today's copyright system is structured to protect the interests of yesterday's distributors.
"[I]f adequate financial incentives or market conditions exist to inspire the creative acitivity of authors and encourage them to make their works available to the public without copyright, copyright protection should not be recognized." [pg 6-FN 40]
"Today, the economics of digital technology renders copyright both unnecessary and inefficient. In general, discussions about the optimal level of copyright protection ignore distinctions between the incentives from creation and distribution. In part, the bundling of these interests was strategic. Distributors found that it was to their political advantage to have their interests treated as inseperable from the interest of creators. In addition to the rhetorical power of equating the interests of distributors with creators, until now the bundling of interests was acceptable because the cost of producing the vessels --CD's, books, DVD's-- for content, and distributing those vessels, was an essential component of making content available to the public. As a result, both sets of costs had to be considered if the public was to enjoy and have access to the products of human creativity. However, as the following demonstrates, because the Internet and digital technology have revolutionized the ways in which we disseminate information, it is no longer appropriate to treat these interests as interchangeable. Once they are unbundled, it becomes clear that copyright protection cannot be justified as a means of ensuring distribution and is an impermissibly inefficient means for ensuring creation." [pg 6]
Ku makes his argument by using the music industry as an example of how the interest of creators and distributors are deceptively coupled, but in reality, they are no longer aligned. He makes his case by comparing the change in income for artists from CD sales vs. live performances since the introduction of the internet and the advancement in digital technologies.
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